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Abstract
Machine Learning (ML) models are susceptible to evasion at-
tacks. Evasion accuracy is typically assessed using aggregate
evasion rate, and it is an open question whether aggregate eva-
sion rate enables feature-level diagnosis on the effect of adver-
sarial perturbations on evasive predictions. In this paper, we
introduce a novel framework that harnesses explainable ML
methods to guide high-fidelity assessment of ML evasion at-
tacks. Our framework enables explanation-guided correlation
analysis between pre-evasion perturbations and post-evasion
explanations. Towards systematic assessment of ML evasion
attacks, we propose and evaluate a novel suite of model-
agnostic metrics for sample-level and dataset-level correlation
analysis. Using malware and image classifiers, we conduct
comprehensive evaluations across diverse model architectures
and complementary feature representations. Our explanation-
guided correlation analysis reveals correlation gaps between
adversarial samples and the corresponding perturbations per-
formed on them. Using a case study on explanation-guided
evasion, we show the broader usage of our methodology for
assessing robustness of ML models.
1 Introduction
The widespread usage of machine learning (ML) in a myr-
iad of application domains has brought adversarial threats to
ML models to the forefront of research towards dependable
and secure ML systems. From image classification [34] to
voice recognition [15], from precision medicine [21] to mal-
ware/intrusion detection [43] and autonomous vehicles [48],
ML models have been shown to be vulnerable not only to
training-time poisoning and evasion attacks, but also to model
extraction and membership inference attacks [12]. In typical
evasion attacks, an adversary perturbs a legitimate input to
craft an adversarial sample that tricks a victim model into
making an incorrect prediction.
Motivation: Prior work has demonstrated adversarial
sample-based evasion of ML models across diverse domains
such as image classifiers [14, 23, 35, 39, 41], malware clas-
sifiers [6, 7, 10, 17, 24, 30, 43, 57], and other domains such
as speech and text processing [13]. Evasion attacks have
been explored across varying threat models (e.g., black-box
[9,24,30–32,47,55,57], white-box [6,17,46,55]). In the cur-
rent state-of-the-art, the effectiveness of evasion is typically
assessed through aggregate evasion rate by computing the
percentage of crafted adversarial samples that lead a model
to make evasive predictions. For a ML model f that accepts
a d-dimensional input x = [x1, ...,xd ] to predict f (x) = ytrue,
the adversary perturbs x to obtain x′ = [x1 + δ1, ...,xd + δd ],
where δ = [δ1, ...,δd ] represents pre-evasion perturbations
applied to each feature. When f is queried with x′, it produces
an evasive prediction f (x′) = y′ 6= ytrue. The natural question
then is whether there exists correlation between pre-evasion
perturbations and the evasive prediction. Unfortunately, ag-
gregate evasion rate is inadequate to offer fine-grained in-
sights to answer this question. In particular, it does not show
how much the evasion strategy, through adversarial pertur-
bations, influences individual samples to result in an evasive
prediction. We consequently argue that unless one “unpacks”
aggregate evasion rate at the resolution of an adversarial sam-
ple, it could give false sense of evasion success for it lacks
the fidelity at the level of individual features. Such a coarse-
grained nature of the aggregate evasion metric can potentially
misguide the evaluation of model robustness in the face of
adversarial manipulations.
Approach: In this paper, we harness feature-based ML ex-
planation methods and propose an explanation-guided corre-
lation analysis framework for evasion attacks on ML models.
Explainable ML techniques [27, 38, 44, 50] interpret predic-
tions returned by a ML model and attribute model’s decision
(e.g., predicted class label) to feature importance weights. In
particular, for each evasive prediction f (x′)= y′ 6= ytrue, expla-
nation methods such as LIME [44] and SHAP [38] produce
post-evasion explanations of the form [x1 : w1, ...,xd : wd ],
where wi is the weight of contribution of feature xi to the eva-
sive prediction y′. To address the lack of detailed insights from























and empirically explore their feature-level correlations with
pre-evasion perturbations performed by the adversary. Our
key insight is that, since the perturbations are the only manip-
ulations done on the feature-space of an input sample, when
the model makes an evasive prediction on a perturbed vari-
ant of the input sample, there should exist some correlation
between pre-evasion perturbations and post-evasion expla-
nations. Towards systematic assessment of the link between
adversarial perturbations and evasive predictions, we propose
and evaluate a novel suite of metrics that allow (adversarial)
sample-level and (evasion) dataset-level diagnosis of evasion
attacks. Our suite of metrics are applicable to any ML model
that predicts a class label given an input because, in the de-
sign of the metrics, we make no assumptions about the ML
task and model architecture. The benefit of our fine-grained
diagnosis for a defender whose aim is to evaluate ML model
robustness to evasion attacks is twofold. First, it enables sys-
tematic measurement of the strength of correlation between
an evasive prediction and feature-level perturbations across
diverse classification tasks, model architectures, and feature
representations. Second, it allows zooming-in on limitations
of feature perturbation strategies to inform pre-deployment
adversarial robustness evaluation of ML models.
Note on Scope: We note that our approach is not yet an-
other adversarial sample crafting approach for which problem-
space to feature-space mapping is crucial to maintain func-
tional integrity of adversarial samples (e.g., in adversarial mal-
ware samples). Our approach rather relies on feature-space
perturbations performed to craft an adversarial sample and
model output explanations of the same sample to perform
correlation analysis and empirically examine the strength-
/weakness of the link between perturbations and explanations.
Evaluation Highlights: We evaluate our framework across
different classification tasks (image, malware), diverse model
architectures (e.g., neural networks, multiple tree-based clas-
sifiers, logistic regression), and complementary feature rep-
resentations (pixels for images, static and dynamic analysis-
based features for malware). Our explanation-guided correla-
tion analysis reveals an average of 45% per-model adversarial
samples that have low correlation links with perturbations
performed on them –indicating the inadequacy of aggregate
evasion rate, but the utility of fine-grained correlation analysis,
for reliable diagnosis of evasion accuracy. Our results addi-
tionally suggest that, although a perturbation strategy evades
a target model, at the granularity of each feature perturbation,
it can lead to a per-model average of 36% negative feature per-
turbations (i.e., perturbations that contribute to maintain the
original true prediction fb(x′) = ytrue). We further evaluate the
utility of our framework in a case study on explanation-guided
adversarial sample crafting.
Contributions: In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• Explanation-guided diagnosis of evasion attacks. To im-
prove the sole reliance of evasion assessment on aggregate
evasion rate, we propose an explanation-guided correlation
analysis framework at the resolution of individual features.
To that end, we introduce a novel suite of correlation analysis
metrics and demonstrate their effectiveness at pinpointing
adversarial examples that indeed evade a model, yet exhibit
loose correlation with perturbations performed to craft them.
• Comprehensive evaluations. In malware classification and
image classification, we conduct extensive evaluations across
diverse models architectures and feature representations, and
synthesize interesting experimental insights that demonstrate
the utility of explanation-guided correlation analysis.
• Further case study. We conduct a case study that demon-
strates a practical use-case of our framework via pre-
perturbation feature direction analysis to guide evasion strate-
gies towards crafting more accurate adversarial samples cor-
related with their evasive predictions.
2 Background: ML Evasion and Explanation
Methods
In this section, we succinctly introduce ML evasion attacks
and ML explanation methods.
2.1 ML Evasion Attacks
Adversarial Sample Crafting. Given a deployed ML model
(e.g., malware classifier, image classifier) with a decision
function f : X → Y that maps an input sample x ∈ X to a true
class label ytrue ∈ Y , then x′ = x+δ is called an adversarial
sample with an adversarial perturbation δ if: f (x′) = y′ 6=
ytrue, ||δ||< ε, where ||.|| is a distance metric (e.g., one of the
Lp norms) and ε is the maximum allowable perturbation that
results in misclassification while preserving semantic integrity
of x. Semantic integrity is domain and/or task specific. For
instance, in image classification, visual imperceptibility of x′
from x is desired while in malware detection x and x′ need to
satisfy certain functional equivalence (e.g., if x was a malware
pre-perturbation, x′ is expected to exhibit maliciousness post-
perturbation as well). In untargeted evasion, the goal is to
make the model misclassify a sample to any different class
(e.g., for a roadside sign detection model: misclassify red
light as any other sign). When the evasion is targeted, the
goal is to make the model to misclassify a sample to a specific
target class (e.g., in malware detection: misclassify malware
as benign).
Evasion attacks can be done in white-box or black-box set-
ting. Most gradient-based evasion techniques [14, 23, 35, 39]
are white-box because the adversary typically has access to
model architecture and parameters/weights, which allows to
query the model directly to decide how to increase the model’s
loss function. In recent years, several white-box adversarial
sample crafting methods have been proposed, specially for
image classification tasks. Some of the most notable ones
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are: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [23], Basic Itera-
tive Method (BIM) [35], Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
method [39], and Carlini & Wagner (CW) method [14]. Black-
box evasion techniques usually start from some initial per-
turbation δ0, and subsequently probe f on a series of pertur-
bations f (x+δi), to craft a variation of x that evades f (i.e.,
misclassified to a label different from its original). In malware
classifiers, while gradient-based methods have been widely
adopted both in white-box and black-box settings, two other
strategies also standout for evasion in a black-box setting.
The first one is called additive because it appends adversarial
noise (e.g., no-op bytes) to the end of a sample (e.g., Win-
dows PE) in order to preserve original behavior [24, 33]. The
second class of methods uses targeted and constrained manip-
ulations after identifying regions in the PE that are unlikely
to be mapped to memory [55].
One of the challenges for state-of-the-art adversarial sam-
ple crafting methods is the lack/impossibility of mapping
of feature-space perturbations to the problem space. Such
a mapping and reversibility between the two spaces is es-
sential in domains where the functionality of an adversarial
sample needs to be preserved post-perturbation [28]. A re-
cent work by Pierazzi et al. [42] proposes formulations and
shows promising experimental results towards the feasibility
of crafting evasive malware samples with real-world conse-
quences. As explained in section 1, we recall that problem
space perturbations are out of this paper’s scope.
2.2 ML Explanation Methods
Humans typically justify their decision by explaining underly-
ing causes used to reach a decision. For instance, in an image
classification task (e.g., cats vs. dogs), humans attribute their
classification decision (e.g., cat) to certain parts/features (e.g.,
pointy ears, longer tails) of the image they see, and not all fea-
tures have the same importance/weight in the decision process.
ML models have long been perceived as black-box in their
predictions until the advent of explainable ML [38, 44, 50],
which attribute a decision of a model to features that con-
tributed to the decision. This notion of attribution is based on
quantifiable contribution of each feature to a model’s decision.
ML explanation is usually accomplished by training a sub-
stitute model based on the input feature vectors and output
predictions of the model, and then use the coefficients of that
model to approximate the importance and direction (class
label it leans to) of the feature. A typical substitute model for
explanation is of the form: s(x) = w0 +∑di=1 wixi, where d is
the number of features, x is the sample, xi is the ith feature
for sample x, and wi is the contribution/weight of feature xi
to the model’s decision. While ML explanation methods exist
for white-box [51, 53] or black-box [27, 38, 44] access to the
model, in this work we consider ML explanation methods that
have black-box access to the ML model, among which the
notable ones are LIME [44], SHAP [38] and LEMNA [27].
Next, we briefly introduce these explanation methods.
LIME and SHAP. Ribeiro et al. [44] introduce LIME as
one of the first model-agnostic black-box methods for locally
explaining model output. Lundberg and Lee further extended
LIME by proposing SHAP [38]. Both methods approximate
the decision function fb by creating a series of l perturbations
of a sample x, denoted as x′1, ...,x
′
l by randomly setting fea-
ture values in the vector x to 0. The methods then proceed by
predicting a label fb(x′i) = yi for each x
′
i of the l perturbations.
This sampling strategy enables the methods to approximate
the local neighborhood of fb at the point fb(x). LIME approx-
imates the decision boundary by a weighted linear regression









In Equation 1, G is the set of all linear functions and πx is a
function indicating the difference between the input x and a
perturbation x′. SHAP follows a similar approach but employs
the SHAP kernel as weighting function πx, which is computed
using the Shapley Values [49] when solving the regression.
Shapley Values are a concept from game theory where the
features act as players under the objective of finding a fair
contribution of the features to the payout –in this case the
prediction of the model.
LEMNA. Another black-box explanation method specif-
ically designed to be a better fit for non-linear models is
LEMNA [27]. As shown in Equation 2, it uses a mixture
regression model for approximation, that is, a weighted sum





π j(β j.x+ ε j) (2)
In Equation 2, the parameter K specifies the number of mod-
els, the random variables ε = (ε1, ...,εK) originate from a
normal distribution εi ∼ N(0,σ) and π = (π1, ...,πK) holds
the weights for each model. The variables β1, ...,βK are the
regression coefficients and can be interpreted as K linear ap-
proximations of the decision boundary near fb(x).
3 Explanation-Guided Evasion Diagnosis
Framework
In this section, we present our explanation-guided correlation
analysis methodology. Table 1 describes notations used here
and in the rest of the paper.
3.1 Overview
As described in Section 1, the effectiveness of an evasion
method is typically assessed using aggregate evasion accu-




Xb training set of black-box model fb.
Xe evasion set disjoint with Xb.
X ′e adversarial counterpart of Xe.
Xs training set of explanation model fs.
x ∈ Xe sample in evasion set.
x′ ∈ X ′e adversarial variant of x.
Y = {y1, ...,yk} set of classes (labels)
x = [x1, ...,xd ] d-dimensional feature vector of sample x.
Wx,yi = {w1, ...,wd} feature weights (explanations) of a sample x toward the class yi.
pos(x,yi) number of features in x positive to the prediction fb(x) = yi
neg(x,yi) number of features in x negative to the prediction fb(x) = yi
neut(x,yi) number of features in x neutral to the prediction fb(x) = yi
P(x′) number of perturbed features in x′
τ threshold to decide highly-correlated adversarial samples.
of an evasion strategy, it fails to offer sufficient insights. In
particular, it does not show how the evasion mechanism influ-
ences individual samples to result in evasive predictions. We
argue that, unless one examines evasion success at the resolu-
tion of each adversarial sample, aggregate evasion rate could
give false sense of adversarial success for it lacks feature-level
fidelity of perturbations that result in an adversarial sample.
To address the stated lack of fidelity in aggregate evasion
accuracy, we systematically explore how ML explanation
methods are harnessed to assess feature-level correlations be-
tween pre-evasion adversarial perturbations and post-evasion
explanations.
Figure 1 shows an overview of our explanation-guided
correlation analysis framework. Given an evasion set X ′e of
adversarial samples, our framework enables correlation analy-
sis both at the sample-level (for each x′ ∈ X ′e at the granularity
of each perturbed feature) and at the evasion dataset-level
(∀x′ ∈ X ′e). Intuitively, given a decisive feature (obtained via
ML explanations) of an evasive sample ( fb(x′) 6= ytrue), for
such a feature to be considered the cause of (correlated to) the
evasion, there needs to be a corresponding feature that was
perturbed in the original sample x. By repeating the correla-
tion of each decisive feature with its perturbed counterpart,
our sample-level correlation analysis establishes empirical
evidence that links an evasive prediction with its cause.
More precisely, our correlation analysis is performed by
harnessing the post-evasion features directions (“2. Expla-
nation” in Figure 1) of adversarial samples (“1. Evasion” in
Figure 1). First, we explore the feature directions of the pre-
evasion perturbations in order to obtain an assessment of the
contribution of each feature perturbation to the attack (i.e.,
feature-level assessment). Second, we use those results in
order to zoom-out to a sample-level assessment (3.3). Finally,
we move to the higher level of the whole evasion dataset in
order to obtain an overall assessment of the evasion attack
(3.4).
Conducting such fine-grained correlation analysis has two
key benefits. Firstly, it verifies whether evasion can be at-
tributed to the adversarial perturbations employed on the sam-
ple, and, in effect, performs diagnosis on aggregate evasion
accuracy. Secondly, it provides visibility into how sensitive
certain samples and/or features are to adversarial perturba-
tions, which could inform robustness assessment of ML mod-
els in the face of evasion attacks.
3.2 Post-Evasion Feature Direction
In a typical classification task, for an input sample x, fb(x) =
yi ∈ Y = {y1, ...,yk}, where Y is the set of k possible labels.
For example, in the multi-class handwritten digit recogni-
tion model of the MNIST [36] dataset, the input is an im-
age of a handwritten digit and the label is one of the 10
digits (i.e., Y = {0, ..,9} where k = 10). In the malware de-
tection domain, the typical model is a binary classifier (i.e.,
Y = {Benign,Malware} where k = 2). Next, we use MNIST
as an illustrative example to describe post-evasion feature
direction.
Explanations returned from ML explanation methods re-
veal the direction of each feature. For each class yi ∈ Y and
an adversarial sample x′, a ML explanation method returns a
set of feature weights Wx′,yi = {w1, ..,wd} where w j reflects
the importance (as the magnitude of w j) and the direction
(as the sign of w j) of the feature x′j towards the prediction
fb(x′) = yi. Depending on the sign of w j, feature x′j can be
positive, negative, or neutral with respect to the prediction
fb(x′) = yi. When w j > 0, we say x′j is positive to (directed
towards) yi. Conversely, when w j < 0, x′j is negative to (di-
rected away from) y′i. When w j = 0, we say x
′


























3.1 Sample-Level Analysis 3.2 Evasion Dataset-Level Analysis
ML Explainer
Figure 1: Explanation-guided correlation analysis framework.
yi (does not have any impact on the prediction decision). In
case of binary classification (k = 2), if x′j is not directed to the
label y1 (Benign for malware detection) and is not neutral,
then x′j can only be directed to the other label y2 (Malware)
and vice versa. To illustrate how we leverage feature direction
in our analysis, next we describe a concrete example from the
MNIST [36] handwritten digit recognition model.
In Figure 2, the upper box shows SHAP [38] pre-evasion
feature explanations of a correct prediction on an image of “9“
(i.e., fb(x) = 9). The lower box shows post-evasion feature
explanations of the misclassification fb(x′) 6= 9 using an ad-
versarial variant x′← x+δ. Each column (i.e., “Label = yi“;
yi ∈ {0, ...,9}) represents the feature directions for the possi-
bility of a prediction fb(x) = yi (upper box) and fb(x′) = yi
(lower box). The color codes are interpreted as follows: given
an explanation, pink corresponds to positive features while
blue corresponds to negative features. The intensity of either
color (pink or blue) is directly proportional to the feature
weight towards the prediction. Neutral features are repre-
sented with white. For instance, focusing on the correct pre-
diction label ytrue = 9 in the upper-box, we notice a large
concentration of pink features which positively contribute to
the predicted label (9).
Our approach primarily relies on post-evasion explana-
tions (lower box in Figure 2) and we observe that feature
importance weights vary for each studied label as a poten-
tial prediction fb(x′) = yi ∈ {0, ...,9}. When the prediction
fb(x′) = 8 (image below ’Label = 8’ in lower box), the expla-
nations show that most features are positive (directed to label
8), which explains the change of the prediction label from 9
to 8. Examining the colors, we realize that most features that
were directed to label 9 in the pre-perturbation explanations
have become either neutral to the prediction fb(x′) = 9 or are
positive towards fb(x′) = 8. It is noteworthy that some per-
turbed features are oriented to the original label 9 (notice pink
pixels in the image below ’Label = 9’ in lower box). Such
observations suggest that even though the attack is successful
(i.e., fb(x′) = 8 6= 9), the effectiveness of each single feature
perturbation is not guaranteed to result in an evasive predic-
tion. Thus, the evasion success may not always be correlated
with each feature perturbation the adversary performs on the
original sample. We, therefore, argue that a perturbation strat-
egy that produces many features that are uncorrelated with
the misclassification might perform poorly on other feature
representations (e.g., colored or not centered images in image
classification) or other feature types (e.g., static vs. dynamic
features in malware detection) which reflects a potential lim-
itation of the stability of a perturbation method. Next, we
introduce novel sample-level metrics that capture the fine-
grained assessment that leverages post-evasion explanations.
We refer to Table 1 for the feature direction-related notations.
Our focus will be on the post-perturbation feature directions
of an evasive sample x′ and we suppose that its original pre-
diction (pre-perturbation) is fb(x) = ytrue.
3.3 Sample-Level Analysis
Post-evasion explanations reveal the direction (positive, neg-
ative, or neutral) of each perturbed feature in an adversarial
sample x′. Sample-level analysis is performed in order to em-
pirically assess feature perturbations that positively contribute
towards misclassification (positive perturbations) against the
ones that contribute to maintain the true label as a prediction
(negative perturbations). Next, we introduce two sample-level
metrics which will later serve as foundations to conduct over-
all correlation analysis over the evasion dataset.
Definition 1: Per-Sample Perturbation Precision
(PSPP). Out of all performed feature perturbations (P(x′)) to
produce an adversarial sample x′, PSPP enables us compute
the rate of perturbations that contribute to change the original
prediction ytrue to another label yi ∈ Y −{ytrue}. In other
words, it measures the rate of perturbed features that are
“negative" to the original prediction (ytrue) and “positive"
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Figure 2: A comparative illustration of pre-perturbation and post-perturbation explanations using the SHAP [38] ML explanation
framework on a test sample from the MNIST [36] dataset.
positive perturbations because they positively advance the
evasion goal. More formally, the Per-Sample Perturbation

















Equation 3 is the average of two ratios:
• ( 1k−1 (∑ yi∈Y
yi 6=ytrue
pos(x′,yi)
P(x′) ): The average rate of perturbed fea-
tures that are directed to a class yi 6= ytrue, over all k−1 pos-
sible false classes yi ∈ Y −{ytrue}.
• ( neg(x
′,ytrue)
P(x′) ): The rate of perturbed features that are not di-
rected to the original label ytrue and not neutral.
Both ratios that are considered in Equation 3 measure
Positive Perturbations that contribute to a misclasssifica-
tion. We note that PSPP(x′) falls in the range [0,1]. The
closer PSPP(x′) is to 1, the more the overall perturbations
performed on the features of x′ are precise (effective at fea-
ture level). More importantly, when x′ evades the model, i.e.,
fb(x′) 6= fb(x), then the closer PSPP(x′) is to 1 the stronger
the correlation between the evasion success and each per-
formed feature perturbation that produced adversarial sample
x′.
Definition 2: Per-Sample Perturbation Error (PSPE).
Another per-sample measurement for our correlation analysis
is the Per-Sample Perturbation Error, PSPE(x′), that com-
putes the rate of perturbed features that are directed to the
original class ytrue (positive to the original prediction ytrue).
These features stand against the adversary’s goal of misclassi-
fying x′. Such features are considered negative perturbations






Given an adversarial sample x′, PSPE(x′) returns the rate
of perturbation errors over all perturbed features. We note
that a perturbed feature that is neutral (w j = 0) to the orig-
inal prediction ( fb(x′) = ytrue) is considered neither as per-
turbation error nor an effective manipulation to advance the
evasion goal. Thus, PSPE(x′) may not be directly computed
from PSPP(x′) and vice versa. Moreover, in the case of a
slightly different threat model in-which the evasion is targeted
to change the original prediction ytrue to a new target label
ytarget ∈ Y −{ytrue}, then only the term
pos(x′,ytarget )
P(x′) would be
considered to compute the perturbation precision PSPP(x′),
and only the term neg(x
′,ytarget )
P(x′) suffices to compute the rate of
committed perturbation errors, PSPE(x′).
3.4 Evasion Dataset-Level Analysis
Using PSPP(x′) and PSPE(x′) defined in Equations 3 and 4
as foundations, we now introduce novel correlation analysis
metrics that operate at the level of the evasion dataset X ′e to
empirically analyze correlation between perturbations and
post-evasion explanations.
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Definition 3: High-Correlation Rate (HCR). As ex-
plained in Section 3.3, PSPP(x′) quantifies the correlation
of each single feature perturbation with the evasion fb(x′) 6=
ytrue. The closer PSPP(x′) is to 1, the higher is the correlation
and vice-versa. We consider a threshold τ that indicates the
“strength” of the correlation between positive perturbations
on x that resulted in x′ and the important features that “ex-
plain” fb(x′) 6= ytrue. Based on an empirically estimated τ,
we call an adversarial sample x′ a High-Correlated Sample if
PSPP(x′) falls in [τ,1]. In our evaluation, based on empirical
observations, we use τ = 0.5.
Based on the above definition, we compute High-
Correlation Rate (HCR) as the percentage of High-Correlated
Samples in the evasion set X ′e as follows:
HCR =
|X ′e(PSPP > τ)|
|X ′e|
(5)
where X ′e(PSPP > τ) = {x′ ∈ X ′e : PSPP(x′)> τ}∩{ fb(x′) 6= ytrue}.
We note that HCR quantifies the degree to which adversarial
samples are both evasive and correlated to most feature
perturbations performed on original samples.
Definition 4: Average Perturbation Error (APE). As
shown in Equation 4, PSPE(x′) computes the number of er-
rors committed during the perturbation of each feature in x to
produce the manipulated sample x′ (which is the same as com-
puting the number of negative perturbations). We leverage
PSPE(x′) to compute the average of negative perturbations







As opposed to aggregate evasion rate that computes the
percentage of evasive samples versus non-evasive samples
without deeper insights about the effectiveness of each sin-
gle feature perturbation, APE computes the rate of “evasive
features" versus “non-evasive features" of each evasive sam-
ple, over all perturbed samples. Such in-depth investigations
into evasion attacks provide a fine-grained assessment of any
evasion strategy on ML models.
4 Evaluation
We now evaluate the utility of our suite of metrics for high-
fidelity correlation analysis of ML evasion attacks. We first,
define the experimental setup in section 4.1 and 4.2 and we
validate our methodology in Section 4.3. Then we extend our
evaluation with a case study in Section 5.
4.1 Datasets
We use three datasets from two domains. From the malware
classification domain, we use two complementary datasets,
one based on static analysis, and the other on execution behav-
ioral analysis. From image classification, we use a benchmark
handwritten digits recognition dataset. We selected these two
as representative domains because (a) malware detection is
a naturally adversarial domain where adversarial robustness
to evasion attacks is expected and (b) image recognition has
been heavily explored for evasion attacks in recent adversarial
ML literature [13]. We describe these datasets next.
CuckooTrace (PE Malware). We collected 40K Windows
PE files with 50% malware (collected from VirusShare [4])
and the other 50% benign PEs (collected from a public good-
ware site [1]). We use 60% of the dataset as a training set
for the target black-box model, 25% as a training for expla-
nation substitute model, and the remaining 15% as evasion
test. Each sample is represented as a binary feature vector.
Each feature indicates the presence/absence of behavioral
features captured up on execution of each PE in the Cuckoo
Sandbox [2]. Behavioral analysis of 40K PEs resulted in 1549
features, of which 80 are API calls, 559 are I/O system files,
and 910 are loaded DLLs.
EMBER (PE Malware). To assess our framework on com-
plementary (static analysis-based) malware dataset, we use
EMBER [8], a benchmark dataset of malware and benign PEs
released with a trained LightGBM with 97.3% test accuracy.
EMBER consists of 2351 features extracted from 1M PEs
using a static binary analysis tool LIEF [3]. The training set
contains 800K samples composed of 600K labeled samples
with 50% split between benign and malicious PEs and 200K
unlabeled samples, while the test set consists of 200K samples,
again with the same ratio of label split. VirusTotal [5] was
used to label all the samples. The feature groups include: PE
metadata, header information, byte histogram, byte-entropy
histogram, string information, section information, and im-
ported/exported functions. We use 100K of the test set for
substitute model training, and the remaining 100K as our eva-
sion set against the LightGBM pre-trained model and a DNN
which we trained. We use version 2 of EMBER.
MNIST (Image). To further evaluate our framework on
image classifiers, we use the MNIST [36] dataset, which com-
prises 60K training and 10K test images of handwritten digits.
The classification task is to identify the digit corresponding
to each image. Each 28x28 gray-scale sample is encoded as a
vector of pixel intensities in the interval [0, 1].
4.2 Models and Setup
Studied ML Models. Across CuckooTrace, EMBER and
MNIST, we train 8 models: Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP),
Logistic Regression (LR), Random Forest (RF), Extra Trees
(ET), Decision Trees (DT), Light Gradient Boosting deci-
sion tree Model (LGBM), a Deep Neural Network (DNN),
and a 2D Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). As in prior
work [40, 41], we choose these models because they are rep-
resentative of applications of ML across domains including
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image classification, malware/intrusion detection, and they
also complement each other in terms of their architecture and
susceptibility to evasion.
Employed Evasion Attacks. Using the evasion set of each
dataset, we craft adversarial samples. For the evasion attack,
we consider a threat model where the adversary has no knowl-
edge about the target model, but knows features used to train
the model (e.g., API calls for malware classifiers, pixels for
image classifiers). More precisely, for CuckooTrace and EM-
BER we incrementally perturb features of a Malware sample
until the model flips its label to Benign. Following previous
adversarial sample crafting methods [30, 55], we adopt only
additive manipulations. For instance, for binary features of
CuckooTrace (where 1 indicates presence and 0 indicates ab-
sence of an API call), we flip only a 0 to 1. Similar to prior
work [52], we also respect the allowable range of perturba-
tions for each static feature in EMBER (e.g., file size is always
positive). For MNIST, we add a random noise to the back-
ground of the image to change the original gray-scale of each
pixel without perturbing white pixels that characterize the
handwritten digit. The outcome is an adversarial image that is
still recognizable by humans, but misclassified by the model.
Table II shows the comparison between pre-evasion accuracy
and post-evasion accuracy. All models exhibit significant drop
in the test accuracy after the feature perturbations. We recall
that the main purpose of our analysis is to explore the corre-
lation between a perturbed feature and the misclassification
result, regardless of the complexity of the evasion strategy.
Thus, our choice of perturbation methods is governed by con-
venience (e.g., execution time) and effectiveness (i.e., results
in evasion).
Employed ML Explanation Methods. Informed by re-
cent studies [18, 56] that compare the utility of ML explana-
tion methods, we use LIME [44] on CuckooTrace and EM-
BER, and SHAP [38] on MNIST. More specifically, these
studies perform comparative evaluations of black-box ML ex-
planation methods (e.g., LIME [44], SHAP [38], and LEMNA
[27]) in terms of effectiveness (e.g., accuracy), stability (i.e.,
similarity among results of different runs), efficiency (e.g.,
execution time), and robustness against small feature per-
turbations. On the one hand, these studies show that LIME
performs best on security systems (e.g., Drebin+ [25], Mim-
icus+ [27]). Thus, we employ LIME on the two malware
detection systems (i.e., CuckooTrace and EMBER). On the
other hand, SHAP authors proposed a ML explainer called
“Deep Explainer”, designed for deep learning models, specifi-
cally for image classification. Thus, we use SHAP to explain
predictions of a CNN on MNIST. We note that independent
recent studies [18, 56] suggested that both LIME and SHAP
outperform LEMNA [27].
4.3 Correlation Analysis Results
Results Overview. Across all models and the three datasets,
the evasion attack scores an average HCR = 55% and APE =
36%. Linking back to what these metrics mean, an average
HCR = 55% shows that for each model an average of only
55% of the adversarial samples have strong feature-level cor-
relation with their respective perturbations. That entails an
average of 45% adversarial samples per-model are loosely cor-
related with their perturbations. APE assesses the per-model
average number of negative perturbations per sample. Results
in Table 3 suggest a significant rate of negative perturbations
are produced by the evasion attack. More precisely, on aver-
age across all models around 36% of the perturbations are
negative (i.e., they lead the evasion strategy in the wrong di-
rection, by increasing the likelihood of predicting the original
label). Next, we expand on these highlights of our findings.
Does evasion imply correlation between perturbations
and explanations? Although an evasion attack can achieve
a seemingly high aggregate evasion rate (e.g., as high as
94% accuracy drop on MLP on CuckooTrace), we notice
that, the correlation between each single feature perturbation
and a misclassification is not guaranteed. In fact, averaged
across models, 45% of the crafted adversarial samples have
low-correlated perturbations more than high-correlated ones
(PSPP(x′) < 0.5), suggesting that almost 1 in 2 adversarial
samples suffers from weak correlation between post-evasion
explanations and pre-evasion perturbations. As a result, count-
ing in such samples in the aggregate evasion rate would es-
sentially give false sense of the effectiveness of an attack
strategy at the granularity of each feature perturbation. We
underscore that such insights would not have been possible
to infer without the high-fidelity correlation analysis. In sum-
mary, these results confirm that not all evasive predictions
of an adversarial sample are correlated with the performed
feature manipulations.
Visualizing the Per-Sample Perturbation Precision. Fig-
ure 3 shows the distribution of PSPP values of all crafted
malware samples of CuckooTrace across the 5 models. In
the figure, we use the shorthand PP instead of PSPP in the
y-axis and we refer to the index of each sample in x-axis. The
true prediction of each malware sample is fb(x′) = 1, while
the evasive prediction is fb(x′) = 0 (i.e., adversarial malware
sample is misclassified as benign). The red line in the middle
represents the threshold τ that decides whether the adversarial
sample has more positive perturbations or more negative ones.
In almost all the plots, we notice the occurrence of a signifi-
cant number of low-correlation adversarial malware samples
(PP(x′)< τ) that evaded the classifier (purple circles below
the red line). Once again, these findings suggest that the eva-
sion attack results in a high number of negative perturbations.
However, despite the low number of positive perturbations for
these samples, the evasion is still successful. This result goes
along with our previous finding that high evasion aggregate
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Table 2: Pre-evasion Accuracy and Post-evasion Accuracy across studied models.
Dataset Model Pre-Evasion Post-Evasion Aggregate
Accuracy Accuracy Evasion Accuracy.
CuckooTrace MLP 96% 6.05% 89.95%
CuckooTrace LR 95% 21.75% 73.25%
CuckooTrace RF 96% 18.61% 77.39%
CuckooTrace DT 96% 7.8% 88.20%
CuckooTrace ET 96% 16.27% 79.73%
EMBER LGBM 97.3% 56.06% 40.94%
EMBER DNN 93% 12.08% 80.92%
MNIST CNN 99.4% 33.1% 66.30%
Table 3: High-Correlation Rate and Average Perturbation Error for all models.
Dataset Model High-Correlation Rate Average Perturbation Error
CuckooTrace MLP 34.56% 32.96%
CuckooTrace LR 34.96% 38.92%
CuckooTrace RF 36.09% 60.73%
CuckooTrace DT 66.85% 37.86%
CuckooTrace ET 33.41% 54.62%
EMBER LGBM 95.03% 7.47%
EMBER DNN 96.72% 4.89%
MNIST CNN 44.31% 49.40%
accuracy can have low correlation with performed perturba-
tions. Thus, even for a successful evasion the perturbations at
the feature-level can apparently be ineffective.
Figure 3: Distribution of Perturbation Precision (PSPP) values
of each adversarial sample across models on CuckooTrace.
It is noteworthy that Figure 3 exhibits an unusual behavior.
In particular, some crafted samples with a true prediction
fb(x′) = 1 (yellow circles) appear to have high Perturbation
Precision, PP(x′)> τ, despite the failure to flip the model’s
prediction from 1 to 0. This is especially true for models: LR,
DT, ET and RF. On one hand, this observation suggests that
even a small number of negative perturbations (PP(x′)< τ)
may affect the final outcome of the evasion. On the other hand,
it suggests potential limitations of Black-Box ML explanation
methods in terms of accuracy and stability between different
runs. More discussion is provided about this in Section 6.
What do correlation analysis results suggest across dif-
ferent classification tasks and model architectures? While
our results so far strongly suggest the importance of post-
evasion correlation analysis for an in-depth assessment of an
evasion attack strategy, we also observe that HCR and APE
values vary across studied domains (malware, image), model
architectures, and feature representations (static, dynamic).
This variation speaks to the sensitivity of different domains,
models, and feature values to adversarial feature perturbations
with implications on robustness and dependability in the face
of individual feature perturbation. In fact, ML models trained
on EMBER (LGBM and DNN) showed acceptably low rate
of negative perturbations (i.e., APE = 6% on average) and a
high rate of samples with highly-correlated perturbations (i.e.,
HCR = 96% on average). This suggests that static features of
Windows PE malware are more sensitive to a feature pertur-
bation considering the higher rate of negative perturbations
on dynamic features in CuckooTrace. In terms of comparison
between different domains and different ML models, despite
the high evasion rate at sample-level, almost all ML models
showed some robustness at the level of a single feature per-
turbation. Most importantly, RF on CuckooTrace showed the
highest robustness since more than 60% of the overall feature
perturbations are negative which suggest that they did not con-
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tribute in the misclassification decision. ET on CuckooTrace
(APE = 54%) and CNN on MNIST (APE = 49%) showed
lower robustness than RF, but higher than the other models.
Summary. Our results suggest that aggregate evasion accu-
racy is inadequate to assess the efficacy of perturbation attack
strategy. Our findings also validate that explanation-guided
correlation analysis plays a crucial role in diagnosing ag-
gregate evasion rates to winnow high-correlation adversarial
samples from low-correlation ones for precise feature-level
assessment of evasion accuracy.
5 Case Study
We now present a case study that demonstrates the application
of our correlation analysis framework on explanation-guided
evasion strategy.
5.1 Explanation-Guided Evasion Strategy
The correlation analysis results showed that, while an evasion
strategy may result in an evasive adversarial sample, at the
granularity of a single feature perturbation it may produce
a considerable number of negative perturbations. In other
words, from the adversary’s standpoint, the correlation analy-
sis can be leveraged towards more accurate evasion strategy
that significantly minimizes negative perturbations. In the
following, we explore the potential of explanation methods to
guide a more effective evasion strategy.
In this case study, we demonstrate how an adversary lever-
ages ML explanation methods to examine pre-perturbation
predictions before making feature manipulations. In partic-
ular, the pre-perturbation feature directions reveal positive
features that significantly contribute to the true prediction
(pink pixels in Figure 4). Intuitively, positive features are
strong candidates for perturbations, while negative features
(blue pixels in Figure 4) need not be perturbed since they are
already directed away from the true label, which is in favor of
the adversary’s goal. Neutral features (white pixels in Figure
4) are also not candidates for perturbations since they have
no effect on the original label decision. We note that in this
case study we consider all positive features (i.e., pink pixels)
as candidates for perturbation regardless of the color intensity
that represents its explanation weight. In Figure 4, some pos-
itive pixels (wi > 0) with a low explanation weight (wi ∼ 0)
are almost neutral (i.e., closer to the white color) but still per-
turbed since they are directed to the true label. Using the same
experimental setup, we enhance the evasion strategies used on
the three datasets with explanation-guided pre-perturbation
feature selection. Then, we measure changes to post-evasion
accuracy, HCR, and APE for all studied models.
Directed to 9





Figure 4: An example of explanation-guided feature perturba-
tions on an input sample from MNIST.
5.2 Impact of Explanation-Guided Evasion
Results in Table 4 suggest overall improvement not only in ag-
gregate evasion accuracy, but also in the correlation strength
between evasion explanations and individual feature pertur-
bations. Comparing the “Post-Evasion Accuracy” columns
of Tables 2 and 4, using explanation-guided evasion strategy
post-evasion accuracy drops for all studied models, with an
average per-model drop of 13.4% (which translates to the
same percentage of improvement in aggregate evasion accu-
racy). Interestingly, in 4 out of the 5 models in CuckooTrace,
post-evasion accuracy drops to zero, with up to 21% drop
in post-evasion accuracy for models such as LR. We note
that the eventual complete evasion in almost all models in
CuckooTrace is most likely attributed to the binary nature of
the features, where the explanation-guided feature selection
filters out negative features and leaves only positive features
that are flipped with just one perturbation. Comparing the
HCR columns of Tables 4 and 3, we notice an increase in
HCR for all studied models. On average, HCR increased by
27% per-model, which shows the positive utility of the pre-
perturbation explanations that guided the evasion strategy
to perturb positive features instead of negative ones. Again,
comparing the APE columns of Tables 4 and 3, we notice a
significant drop in APE, with an average per-model decrease
of 20%, which indicates a decrease in the number of negative
perturbations. Better performance in terms of post-evasion
accuracy is also observed for all studied target models.
We note that although we perturb only positive features,
in the APE column of Table 4 all values are still non-zero.
Ideally, the explanation method would guide the perturbation
strategy to perform only positive perturbations and make no
mistaken perturbations. Nevertheless, we still observe a mini-
mal percentage of negative perturbations due to the inherent
limitations of the accuracy and stability of explanations by
LIME and SHAP, which is also substantiated by recent stud-
ies [18, 56] that evaluated LIME and SHAP among other ML
explanation methods. We will expand on limitations of ML
explainers in Section 6.
Summary. This case study suggests that when used on
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Table 4: Post-Evasion Accuracy, HCR, and APE values across studied models using explanation-guided evasion.
Dataset Model Post-Evasion Accuracy HCR APE
CuckooTrace MLP 0% 92.03% 14.22%
CuckooTrace LR 0% 96.25% 6%
CuckooTrace RF 0% 48.53% 51.31%
CuckooTrace DT 1.41% 98.84% 3.41%
CuckooTrace ET 0% 48.11% 1.21%
EMBER LGBM 27.16% 99.58% 2.69%
EMBER DNN 11.7% 97.8% 2.71%
MNIST CNN 24.67% 64.5% 43.4%
top of existing feature perturbation methods, an explanation-
guided feature selection strategy leads to more effective eva-
sion results both in terms of aggregate evasion accuracy and
effectiveness at the level of each feature manipulation.
6 Discussion and Limitations
Recent studies [18, 56] have systematically compared the per-
formance of ML explanation methods especially on security
systems. In addition to general evaluation criteria (e.g., expla-
nation accuracy and sparsity), Warnecke et al. [56] focused on
other security-relevant evaluation metrics (e.g., stability, effi-
ciency, and robustness). Fan et al. [18] also proposed a similar
framework that led to the same evaluation results. Next, we
highlight limitations of LIME [44] and SHAP [38] based on
accuracy (degree to which relevant features are captured in an
explanation), stability (how much explanations vary between
runs), and robustness (the extent to which explanations and
prediction are coupled).
Limitations of Explanation Methods. While LIME
and SHAP produce more accurate results compared with
other black-box explanation methods (e.g., DeepLIFT [50],
LEMNA [27]), the accuracy of the explanation may vary
across different ML model architectures (e.g., MLP, RF,
DT, etc), and across different ML tasks/datasets (e.g., Cuck-
ooTrace, EMBER, and MNIST). For instance, the inherent
linearity of LIME’s approximator could negatively influence
its accuracy and stability in explaining predictions of com-
plex models such as RF and ET. More importantly, like all
learning-based methods, LIME and SHAP are sensitive to
non-determinism (e.g., random initialization, stochastic opti-
mization) which affect their stability between different runs.
In other words, it is likely to observe a slight variation in
the output of multiple runs performed by the same explana-
tion method using the same input data. In fact, we observed
that the average difference between Shapley values (i.e., fea-
ture importance weights) returned by SHAP is around 1%
over 100 runs on the same MNIST sample. Such variation
in ML explanation outputs might partly explain some of the
unexpected results of our explanation-guided analysis that we
noted in Section 4.3.
Vulnerability of Explanation Methods. Another issue
worth considering is robustness of ML explanation methods
against adversarial attacks. Studies [22, 29, 59] have demon-
strated that the explanation results are sensitive to small sys-
tematic feature perturbations that preserve the predicted la-
bel. Such attacks can potentially alter the explanation results,
which might in effect influence our explanation-guided analy-
sis. Consequently, our analysis may produce potentially mis-
leading results for correlation metrics such as HCR and APE.
In light of the utility of ML explanations we demonstrated
in this work, we hope that our framework can be instantiated
for adversarial perturbations performed in the problem-space.
We note, however, that there needs to be careful consideration
in mapping the units of adversarial perturbations in problem
space manipulations (e.g., the organ transplant notions pro-
posed in [42]) to the metrics we proposed in Section 3. Finally,
we note that vulnerability to adversarial attacks is a broader
problem for any ML model, and progress in defense against
attacks such as adversarial examples will potentially inspire
and inform stronger robustness properties for ML explanation
methods.
7 Related Work
We discuss related work focusing on evasion attacks and ML
explanation methods.
Comparing how evasion is assessed, our approach is com-
plementary to prior work [14, 23, 24, 33, 35, 39, 55], which
rely on aggregate evasion accuracy. Next, we shed light on rel-
evant prior work focusing on evasion of image classification
and malware/intrusion detection systems.
Image Classification. Several evasion methods have been
proposed for image classification tasks [13]. Some of the most
notable ones are: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [23],
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [35], Projected Gradient De-
scent (PGD) method [39], and Carlini & Wagner (CW)
method [14].
Windows Malware. Al-Dujaili et. al. [6] leverage saddle-
point formulation towards an adversarial training that incor-
porates adversarial samples to train models robust against
gradient-based attacks such as FGSM [23] and BIM [35].
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Kolosnjaji et. al. [32] proposed a gradient-based attack against
MalConv [43] by appending bytes (in the range 2KB-10KB)
to the overlay of a PE. As a follow-up to [32], Demetrio et.
al. [16] extended the adversarial sample crafting method by
demonstrating the feasibility of evasion by manipulating 58
bytes in the DOS header of PE. Suciu et. al. [55] explored
FGSM [23] to craft adversarial samples against MalConv [32]
by padding adversarial payloads between sections in a PE pro-
vided that there is space to perform padding. Hu and Tan [30]
train a substitute model using the GAN framework to fit a
black-box malware detector trained on API call traces of Win-
dows PEs. In a follow-up work [31], they use the GAN-based
substitute model training for a recurrent neural network.
Other works utilize reinforcement learning to evade mal-
ware classifiers. For instance, Anderson et. al. [9] aim to
limit perturbations to a select set of transformations that are
guaranteed to preserve semantic integrity of a sample us-
ing reinforcement learning. Additionally, Apruzzese et. al.
[10] propose a method that generates realistic attack samples
that can evade botnet detection through deep reinforcement
learning. The generated samples can be used for adversarial
learning. Rosenberg et. al. [47] adopt the Jacobian-based fea-
ture augmentation method introduced in [41] to synthesize
training examples to inject fake API calls to PEs at runt-time.
Using the augmented dataset, they locally train a substitute
model to evade a target RNN black-box malware detector
based on API call features.
Android Malware. Similar to [30] and [31], Grosse et. al.
[24] demonstrate evasion by adding API calls to malicious
Android APKs. Yang et. al. [58] explore semantic analysis
of malicious APKs with the goal of increasing resilience of
Android malware detectors against evasion attacks. Recently,
Pierazzi et. al. [42] take a promising step towards formaliza-
tion of the mapping between feature space and problem space
on the Drebin classifier [11] for Android malware.
PDF Malware. Srndic et. al. [54] are among the first to
demonstrate vulnerabilities of deployed PDF malware detec-
tors using constrained manipulation with semantic preserva-
tion. Xu et. al. [57] use genetic algorithms to manipulate
ASTs of malicious PDFs to generate adversarial variants
while preserving document structure (syntax).
Explanation Methods. Several ML explanation methods
have been proposed by prior work [27, 38, 44, 50]. In a black-
box setting, LIME [44], Anchors [45], SHAP [38], and [26]
are among the typical class of black-box explanation methods
that rely on local approximation. Other methods (e.g., [20,37])
use input perturbation approaches by monitoring prediction
deltas. DeepLIFT [50] explains feature importance with re-
spect to a reference output, while white-box explanation tech-
niques (e.g., [51–53]) use gradient-based feature importance
estimation. Recent studies [18,22,29,56] explore the utility of
explanation methods across criteria such as accuracy, stability,
and robustness of explanations. A more recent interesting ap-
plication is the use of SHAP signatures to detect adversarial
examples in DNNs [19].
In summary, Prior works typically rely on comparing the
pre-perturbation accuracy and post-perturbation accuracy in
order to evaluate ML evasion attacks, which lacks deeper
diagnosis of the attack’s success. In this paper, we add com-
plementary suite of metrics in order to map a single feature
perturbation with its contribution to evasion.
8 Conclusion
We introduced the first explanation-guided methodology for
the diagnosis of ML evasion attacks. To do so, we use fea-
ture importance-based ML explanation methods to enable
high-fidelity correlation analysis between pre-evasion pertur-
bations and post-evasion prediction explanations. To system-
atize the analysis, we proposed and evaluated a novel suite
of metrics. Using image classification and malware detec-
tion as representative ML tasks, we demonstrated the utility
of the methodology across diverse ML model architectures
and feature representations. Through a case study we addi-
tionally confirm that our methodology enables evasion attack
improvement via pre-evasion feature direction analysis.
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